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LOSING THE DIGITAL SHIRT OFF YOUR BACK:
APPLYING THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET
GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT TO VIRTUAL
PROPERTY BETTING
ERIK GERSTNER
ABSTRACT
In recent years, a myriad of websites have been established,
which offer gambling to U.S.-based customers via the Internet,
using virtual items existing only within the realms of online video
games as currency. A relatively new development, this virtual
property has been addressed by courts very little, leaving many
questions about how the law of the U.S. would and should treat it
for purposes including but not limited to gambling. Because virtual
property shares many characteristics with tangible property, it is
likely to be found to share many of the same legal aspects as the
latter, which would permit the Justice Department to attack it as
it has other forms of gambling throughout the years.
One form of regulation which the U.S. government might
use to regulate this virtual property gambling is the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA). In 2011, the U.S.
government used the provisions of the UIGEA to shut down major
websites offering online poker and other forms of gambling within
the U.S., targeting the payment processors handling funds from
American customers. If the Justice Department finds that virtual
property is analogous to tangible property, it would likely approach
regulation of this market in a similar manner as it did in 2011.
This Note argues that because virtual property gambling is a
multibillion-dollar business and should be seen as property in its
own right, regulation via the UIGEA, or other sources is inevitable.
The Author is a JD Candidate at William & Mary Law School. He wishes
to thank: his family for their endless patience and support throughout his education; the Law School faculty for their advice and insights throughout the process of writing this Note; and the staff of the William & Mary Business Law Review
for their tireless efforts in editing and preparing this Note for publication.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 2011, the U.S. Justice Department shook the
poker world when, acting under the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), it unveiled indictments and
filed civil lawsuits against the owners and operators of the three
largest Internet poker companies operating in the country, alleging that their companies continued to accept payments and
financial transactions from American citizens after the passage of
the Act.1 Since this date, known colloquially in the poker community
as “Black Friday,” online poker activity in the United States has
remained considerably reduced, as very few providers are willing
to continually risk accepting financial transactions from American customers.2
Five years later, while traditional online gambling in the
United States remains limited, a new form of betting has become
widespread, centered around competitive video games, or eSports.3
Unlike online poker rooms and casinos, however, these eSports
wagers are not being placed with a “real money” balance, but
rather with virtual property—in this case, digital items created
by game developers that only exist within the framework of the
games themselves.4 While these items do not have any fixed
Martin Harris, Black Friday: Reliving Pokers Darkest Day Five Years
Later, POKERNEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://pokernews.com/news/2016/04/black
-friday-five-years-later-24506.htm [https://perma.cc/X94J-KAHQ]. The three
companies specifically named were PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute
Poker. Id.; see also U.S. ATT’Y S.D.N.Y., MANHATTAN U.S. ATTORNEY CHARGES
PRINCIPALS OF THREE LARGEST INTERNET POKER COMPANIES WITH BANK FRAUD,
ILLEGAL GAMBLING OFFENSES AND LAUNDERING BILLIONS IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING
PROCEEDS (2011), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/April11
/scheinbergetalindictmentpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94M-GCSG]; First Amended
Complaint, U.S. v. PokerStars, 11 Civ. 2564 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), http://online.wsj
.com/public/resources/documents/FullTiltAmendSuit_Sept20_2011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M38X-2JK3].
2 Harris, supra note 1.
3 eSports is defined as “a form of sports where the primary aspects of the
sport are facilitated by electronic systems ….” Juho Hamari & Max Sjöblom,
What is eSports and why do people watch it?, 27 INTERNET RES. 211, 211 (2017).
4 Shaun Assael, Skin in the Game, ESPN (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.espn
.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/18510975/how-counter-strike-turned-teenager-com
pulsive-gambler [https://perma.cc/T65W-E6PZ].
1
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value, the rarest are highly sought after, and command significant real money value; for example, in 2013, one item from the
game Dota 2 sold for $38,000.5 Further, until recently,6 betting with
these items was a multibillion-dollar industry.7 On a single website
in 2015, bettors from around the world placed over $1 million in
wagers on at least fourteen separate Counter-Strike: Global Offense (CS:GO) matches.8 According to the BBC, the total video
game betting market may be worth up to £4 billion;9 in dollars,
approximately $5 billion was wagered in virtual items in 2016.10
Given the amount of money at stake, as well as the current
unregulated state of virtual property, it seems likely that the U.S.
government will be interested in stepping in and closing these
betting markets to American citizens.11 One potential avenue
Wesley Yin-Poole, Someone bought a Dota 2 courier for $38,000, EUROGAMER
(June 11, 2013), http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2013-11-06-someone-bought
-a-dota-2-courier-for-USD38-000 [https://perma.cc/D9MB-4XR8]. Further, according to Yin-Poole, another piece of virtual property sold in 2010 for a staggering $635,000. Id.
6 In 2016, Valve, the publisher of Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO)
and Dota 2, sent cease-and-desist letters to many of the largest websites offering gambling with items from those two games. Assael, supra note 4.
7 CS:GO gambling alone saw $5 billion in virtual item wagering in 2016,
despite the cease-and-desist letters. Id.
8 CS:GO is a team-based first-person shooter video game, in which the players
form two teams that compete against each other (terrorists and counterterrorists). Stephen Totilo, An Hour with Counter-Strike: GO, KOTAKU (Aug. 25,
2011), http://www.kotaku.com/5834542/an-hour-with-counter-strike-go [https://
perma.cc/Y348-6C37]. In its most common gameplay format, the terrorists attempt to plant a bomb on a specific site within an in-game world, and the counterterrorists attempt to stop them from doing so. Id. If the bomb is planted and
explodes, the terrorists win, and if it is planted but is defused, the counterterrorists win. Either team may also win a round if it eliminates all the players
on the other team prior to the bomb being planted. Id.; see also HwanZike, Top
100 CSGL matches by total $value bet, REDDIT (Sep. 12, 2015), https://www
.reddit.com/r/csgobetting/comments/3knxy2/top_100_csgl_matches_by_total
_value_bet/ [https://perma.cc/W5KP-NXAG].
9 Rory Cellan-Jones, YouTuber Nepenthez charged over video game gambling
site, BBC (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37385555 [https://
perma.cc/PX87-7BHP].
10 Assael, supra note 4.
11 Bryce Blum (esportslaw), I’m Bryce Blum, an attorney with a full-time
practice in esports law (including CS:GO), AMA!, REDDIT (Feb. 3, 2016), https://
www.reddit.com/r/GlobalOffensive/comments/440u1w/im_bryce_blum_an_at
torney_with_a_fulltime/czmi2r8 [https://perma.cc/R9NH-BK6J] (Regulation is
5
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would be an attempt to apply the UIGEA to virtual property, and
thus shut down any and all providers of virtual property betting
in a single “Black Friday”-esque stroke.12 This Note will examine
the legal framework surrounding virtual property and gambling,
and argue that it is likely that the federal government will indeed
wish to step in and regulate virtual property gambling, with the
UIGEA being the government’s most likely tool for doing so. Part I
will provide an overview of virtual property and the limited legal
analysis of it thus far.13 Part II will examine the framework of the
UIGEA and its previous applications by the Justice Department,
including its application toward online poker.14 Part III will discuss whether the UIGEA’s text permits its application toward virtual
property.15 Finally, Part IV will discuss the policy concerns inherent
in an application of the UIGEA to virtual property, and examine
alternative forms of regulation that may be preferable instead.16
I. WHAT IS VIRTUAL PROPERTY?
In general, property is often referred to as a “bundle of
sticks,” or rights attached to a given piece of property; of these
“sticks,” the most common ones are: “(1) the right to transfer; (2) the
right to exclude; (3) the right to use; and (4) the right to destroy.”17
While this is fairly intuitive when dealing with tangible goods, it
can be somewhat more difficult to comprehend in virtual realms.18
It is for this reason that there have been very few reported cases
specifically dealing with virtual property in video games and
“inevitable, though predicting when would be total guesswork.”). Also, note
that other governments have already begun applying their own gambling laws
to virtual item betting. See, e.g., Joe Donnelly, First prosecutions made in relation to videogame betting in the UK, PC GAMER (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www
.pcgamer.com/first-prosecutions-made-in-relation-to-videogame-betting-in-the
-uk/ [https://perma.cc/GY6E-3GT7].
12 Harris, supra note 1.
13 See infra Part I.
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 Justin M. Ackerman, Note, An Online Gamer’s Manifesto: Recognizing
Virtual Property Rights by Replacing End User Licensing Agreements in Virtual Worlds, 6 PHX. L. REV. 137, 143 (2012).
18 Id.
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related issues,19 despite the large digital economy that has developed in recent years.20
Given this lack of treatment by U.S. courts, it may be
helpful to view video game virtual property through similar analogues. One of these is Internet domain names, which, in contrast,
have seen substantial litigation since the Internet boom in the
1990s.21 Like digital items in a video game, domain names only
exist electronically;22 the “owner” of a domain name is the party
who gets to decide to which space on the Internet (more commonly
known as a website) the domain name points.23 In one landmark
domain name case, Kremen v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit developed
a three-part test to determine whether a property right existed in
the domain name in question: “[f]irst, there must be an interest
capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of exclusive
possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have
established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”24 The court determined
that the domain name met all three of these prongs, and thus the
plaintiff indeed had an intangible property right in it.25
Applying this three-part test, virtual items in many video
games and other virtual worlds would qualify as property, similar
to domain names. First, virtual items are precisely defined because each individual item is given a unique identification code
by the programmers who create it.26 Second, because each item
One of these few cases is Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
593 (E.D. Pa. 2007), in which a customer of the game “Second Life” sued the
game’s publisher after it revoked in-game property he had purchased; ultimately, the case settled out-of-court, with no legal resolution of the property
issues. Benjamin Duranske, Bragg v. Linden Lab—Confidential Settlement
Reached; ‘Marc Woebegone’ Back in Second Life, VIRTUALLY BLIND (Oct. 4, 2007),
http://www.virtuallyblind.com/2007/10/04/bragg-linden-lab-settlement/ [https://
perma.cc/6Y4S-AV8G].
20 See supra text accompanying notes 5–9.
21 Domain Name Case Law, HARV. L. SCH., https://cyber.harvard.edu/prop
erty00/domain/CaseLaw.html [https://perma.cc/SE6V-6ELW].
22 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 145.
23 Id.
24 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992)).
25 Id.
26 Steam—the platform owned by Valve, and on which Dota 2 and CS:GO,
among many other games, run, for example—utilizes tradeable in-game items
19
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has this unique identification code, it can only be in the control of
a single accountholder, and others cannot take it against this
accountholder’s wishes, meaning that it is exclusive.27 Finally,
one could presume that this accountholder, by virtue of the fact
that it is in her account, will be able to claim exclusivity over the
item. Thus, it would seem that video game items would qualify as
property under the test put forth in Kremen.
Though the above test seems straightforward, there is a
major complication. According to the End User License Agreement (EULA) or Terms of Service (TOS) found in nearly every
piece of software today, in many cases any in-game property is
either impliedly or explicitly deemed not to be owned by a player,
and is instead controlled to at least some degree by the game’s
publisher.28 These agreements range in severity from reserving
limited control over items with the publisher, to explicitly stating
that users retain no ownership stake in in-game items whatsoever.29 This would seem to conflict with the exclusivity prongs
of the test cited in Kremen, as in even the most lenient of these
that must provide a persistent 64-bit identification code for each item. AlexanderCzR, Understanding Item ID’s, REDDIT (June 9, 2015), https://www.reddit
.com/r/SteamBot/comments/394o9d/understanding_item_ids/ [https://perma
.cc/BYJ6-N7FC]. For more information on how this identification code is created, see id.
27 See id.
28 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 162–63.
29 See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (Second Life’s publisher exercised its control over in-game property to
revoke a plot of digital land “owned” by the plaintiff); Steam Subscriber Agreement, VALVE, INC. (Jan. 1, 2016), http://store.steampowered.com/subscriber
_agreement/ [https://perma.cc/ERU3-88VG] (“All title, ownership rights and
intellectual property rights in and to the Content and Services and any and all
copies thereof, are owned by Valve and/or its or its affiliates’ licensors.”); Blizzard’s EULA provides in pertinent part:
Blizzard is the owner or licensee of all right, title, and interest
in and to the Battle.net Client, Battle.net, the Games, Accounts,
and all of the features and components thereof .... The following
components of Battle.net and/or the Games, are owned or licensed by Blizzard ... 4. Items: Virtual goods, currency, potions,
wearable items, pets, mounts, etc.
Battle.net® End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD ENT. (Feb. 28, 2015), http://
us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/eula.html [https://perma.cc/J2JS-QNQH].
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agreements the publisher obtains at least some right of ownership
over any virtual items in the game.30
For users, this is, of course, problematic. In many cases,
users will have obtained virtual property through the investment
of either in-game time and labor or real money purchases.31
Additionally, in nearly all virtual worlds utilizing virtual property,
lucrative markets have sprung up, either sanctioned by the publishers or not, permitting sales of these goods.32 Despite the disclaimers
in EULAs and other agreements, publishers rarely invoke their
rights to control property held by users.33 Practically speaking,
therefore, game publishers have given users the expectation of
property rights in virtual items that can be bought, sold, and
otherwise transferred as with tangible property.34 There is a clear
conflict between users’ contracted rights in the respective software
usage agreements and what is implicitly permitted by publishers.35
While, as mentioned previously, there is no case law as of
yet directly addressing the issue, there is some amount of academic
scholarship surrounding these ownership conflicts and how they
ought to be treated by courts.36 While some argue that the current
state of EULAs and other agreements is likely to remain in place,37
other scholars have made arguments against EULAs including
but not limited to substantial unconscionability, an unreasonable
restraint on goods, a lack of business necessity for such harsh
terms, and the distribution of property falling outside of players’
expectations.38 Others have suggested that public policy concerns
Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Ackerman, supra note 17, at 187.
32 Id. at 178.
33 See, e.g., Statistics, VACBANNED (Nov. 5, 2016), http://www.vacbanned
.com/view/statistics [https://perma.cc/3BFZ-V6TD]. Of the over 179 million
Steam accounts currently in existence, only 1.8 percent have been “banned,” or
excluded from playing or otherwise interacting with certain games or property
the account owners have purchased. Id.
34 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 178.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., id.; Andrea Vanina Arias, Note, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Swords and Armor: Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301,
1303–04, 1308–09 (2008); see generally Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property
Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2006); Allen Chein, Note, A
Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1059 (2006).
37 Chein, supra note 36, at 1090.
38 Arias, supra note 36, at 1332.
30
31
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will require legislative regulation over both EULAs and virtual
property in general.39 However, until there is either a common
law ruling or statute enacted regarding the subject, the state of
virtual property will remain legally in limbo for both game publishers and users.40
II. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2006
One possible way the U.S. government might approach
regulation of virtual property, particularly when it comes to gambling, is through the UIGEA. Enacted in 2006, the UIGEA is the
most recent evolution of the Wire Act of 1961,41 which Congress originally enacted to combat betting connected with organized crime.42
The UIGEA prohibits any “person engaged in the business of
betting or wagering” from “knowingly” accepting: (1) “credit”
(including funds extended from credit cards); (2) “electronic fund[s]
transfer[s]”; (3) “any check[s], draft[s], or similar instrument[s]”;
or (4) “the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction,” as
jointly prescribed by the Federal Reserve.43 Though this seems
fairly straightforward, certain aspects of the statute deserve
closer inspection, especially in light of a potential application to
virtual property and virtual property gambling markets.
In the Findings, attached to the law, Congress noted that,
in the United States, “Internet gambling is a growing cause of
debt collection problems,” and “traditional law enforcement mechanisms are often inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or
regulations on the Internet, especially where such gambling
crosses State or national borders.”44 Though some feel that these
stated purposes for the UIGEA are perfectly legitimate and
reasonable,45 others have claimed that conservative lawmakers’
Id.
Id. at 1332–33, 1337–38.
41 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012).
42 James Romoser, Note, Unstacking the Deck: The Legalization of Online
Poker, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 519, 526 (2013).
43 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
44 Id. § 5361(a)(3)ï(4).
45 Michael A. Tselnik, Note, Check, Raise, or Fold: Poker and the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1617, 1668 (2007).
39
40
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moral disdain for gambling fueled its passage.46 Nonetheless,
these intended applications of the law have continued to shape its
real-world uses since its passage.47
Beyond discussion of the possible legislation of morality
inherent in the UIGEA, there are also concerns with its ambiguous
construction.48 Importantly, the UIGEA does not explicitly prohibit an individual from gambling on the Internet.49 It instead
attacks the revenue stream for the gambling markets and providers by making it illegal for banks and institutions engaged in
the gambling business to knowingly accept funds electronically to
be used for an illegal bet or wager.50 It defines “bet or wager” as:
(a) “the staking or risking of something of value upon the outcome
of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to chance”;
(b) lottery-type games in “which opportunity to win is predominantly subject to chance”; (c) unlawful sports gambling as defined
in 28 U.S.C. § 3702; or (d) “any instruction or information pertaining
to the establishment or movement of funds by the bettor or
customer in, to, or from an account” for the purpose of betting.51
With these key terms defined, the UIGEA can be further
broken down into five elements: (1) a bet or wager must be placed;
(2) on the Internet; (3) that is knowingly accepted; (4) in a jurisdiction where external laws (state or federal) make such a bet
illegal; and (5) that exemptions for certain intrastate and tribal
gambling operations (including state lotteries and Indian casinos)
are not met.52 Note that this largely requires other laws already
on the books to be broken in order for the UIGEA to apply.53
According to federal prosecutors, major online poker companies in 2011 satisfied these elements as required by law.54 The
Romoser, supra note 42, at 520.
Id. at 520ï21.
48 Id. at 536.
49 Andrew M. Nevill, Note, Folded Industry? Black Friday’s Effect on the
Future of Online Poker in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
203, 210 (2013).
50 Id.
51 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A)–(D) (2006).
52 Thomas A. Flynn, Note, The Ace in the Hole: Why the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act Did Not Categorically Ban Online Poker in the
United States, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 75, 84 (2013).
53 Romoser, supra note 42, at 531.
54 Harris, supra note 1.
46
47
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three largest providers of Internet poker in the United States,
along with key individuals in their organizations, were charged
with a multitude of criminal activities, including bank fraud,
conspiracy, violating the UIGEA, money laundering, and operating
an illegal gambling business.55 Regarding the UIGEA charges,
the illegal betting element was met under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (the
“Illegal Gambling Business Act”) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy
to commit offense or defraud in the United States).56 In the end,
the three major poker sites under indictment reached settlements
with the U.S. government wherein, among other things, they
agreed to leave the United States market and would not return
“until it is legal to do so under U.S. law.”57
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE UIGEA TO
VIRTUAL PROPERTY BETTING
When considering whether UIGEA would apply to current
virtual property betting markets, there are several aspects to
consider: (a) whether virtual property, like tangible property, has
real value; (b) the types of gambling done with virtual items; and
(c) the various parties involved in these betting markets to whom
the UIGEA could be applied. This section will examine these
questions in-depth.
A. Does Virtual Property Have Real Value to Satisfy the UIGEA?
The first element to qualify an action for enforcement
under the UIGEA is that a bet or wager must be placed.58 Key to
the definition of “bet or wager” within the UIGEA is that “something
55 Flynn, supra note 52, at 88; see also U.S. ATT’Y S.D.N.Y. PRESS RELEASE,
supra note 1.
56 Flynn, supra note 52, at 94.
57 Id. at 92. As a result, there are currently only a handful of online poker
websites available nationally to United States customers, which suffer from both
a lack of player base and uncertainty regarding any funds deposited into the
system. Id. at 79. However, three states—Nevada, Delaware, and New Jersey—
currently offer intrastate online poker clients, which can only be accessed and
used within the individual states. The Associated Press, Online gaming called
‘new frontier’ for states, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 22, 2013, https://www.re
viewjournal.com/business/online-gaming-called-new-frontier-for-states/ [https://
perma.cc/ST6Z-J5ZW].
58 Flynn, supra note 52, at 84.
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of value” must be staked or wagered as part of the bet.59 As
previously discussed, there is a great deal of debate over whether
in-game items truly have value: on one hand, the EULAs for
virtually all games state that in-game items are not owned by the
player; by not giving users ownership over their own items,
publishers are essentially stating that these items have no practical real-world value since there is no explicit license given in
most agreements to sell or otherwise transfer the publisher’s
property.60 This would suggest that this element of the UIGEA is
unsatisfied, and thus the law would not apply to virtual
property—indeed, two district courts have ruled separately that
virtual currency has no real value when it comes to gambling,
largely because the Terms of Use for each game in question state
that the currency in question has no value.61
On the other hand, however, many publishers have either
tacitly allowed or explicitly created marketplaces or other systems by which users are able to exchange real money for in-game
items.62 In some cases, these only serve to confuse the issue
further. One such example is the Steam Marketplace, a place
within the Steam client, which allows users to buy and sell items
from at least forty different games with a “wallet” of funds
deposited into the Steam system and tied to each individual user
account.63 Though one must utilize real money in order to deposit
31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006).
Ackerman, supra note 17, at 163.
61 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., No. C15-612 MJP, 2015 WL 9839755, at
*4 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (ruling that because the Terms of Use state that users
have no property interest in any virtual item; virtual items may not be transferred, sold, or purchased; and virtual items have no monetary value; any user
doing so is attempting to sue Defendant for their own breach of contract); Mason
v. Machine Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465 (D. Md. 2015) (ruling that, once
Plaintiff had purchased virtual currency, she had swapped something of value
for “something of whimsy” which had no value). Note that both of these cases
involved virtual currency purchased directly from the publisher, and declared
to be strictly for usage within the specific software, unlike Steam items, which
have a built-in framework for trading and other types of transactions between
users. See Assael, supra note 4.
62 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 17, at 157; Arias, supra note 36, at 1302.
63 Community Market, VALVE, INC., http://www.steamcommunity.com/mar
ket/ [https://perma.cc/8H38-QD2F]; see also Community Market FAQ, VALVE,
INC., https://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=6088-UDXM-7214
[https://perma.cc/2WT2-B7FT].
59
60
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these funds, once the user transfers them to the Steam system,
they are no longer the user’s property according to the EULA.64
Additionally, any items traded, purchased, or sold in the Steam
Marketplace are license rights, in which there is no ownership
interest, and Valve does not recognize any trades or sales made
outside of Steam.65 With that said, however, it seems likely that,
because in-game Steam items are convertible to real money through
any process, even a circuitous one, they indeed have “value.”66
The contractual validity of this EULA aside, Valve continues to muddy the waters further within Steam. Despite its
staunch stance that Steam funds have no real monetary value,
the IRS requires Valve to file a Form 1099 (used to report miscellaneous income) for any U.S.-based users who meet a certain
threshold of virtual market transactions per year based on these
sales.67 In other words, regardless of what Valve may believe or
publicly state regarding the real-world monetary value of any
items and funds currently within the Steam trading community,68
the United States government, at least, already feels that these
items do in fact have value and should be viewed through that lens.
Without any case law or other statutory guidance, this real
value requirement in the UIGEA remains undecided, but there
are strong arguments to be made in favor of virtual property
having real value.69 There is the practical consideration that ingame items are often traded for real money, whether through a
publisher-sanctioned marketplace or through a “black market” of
64 According to the text of the agreement, once funds have been added to the
Steam Wallet, they are “non-refundable and non-transferable. Steam Wallet
funds do not constitute a personal property right, have no value outside Steam
and ... have no cash value and are not exchangeable for cash.” Steam Subscriber Agreement, supra note 29.
65 Id.
66 Anita Ramasastry, Could Second Life Be In Serious Trouble? The Risk of
Real-Life Legal Consequences for Hosting Virtual Gambling, FINDLAW (Apr. 11,
2007), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/could-second-life-be-in-seri
ous-trouble-the-risk-of-real-life-legal-consequences-for-hosting-virtual-gambling
.html [https://perma.cc/8L5E-MQ5Y] (discussing whether the in-game currency in
Second Life, the “Linden Dollar,” would be subject to UIGEA scrutiny).
67 Community Market FAQ, supra note 63.
68 Steam Subscriber Agreement, supra note 29.
69 See Kurt Hunt, This Land Is Not Your Land: Second Life, CopyBot, and
the Looming Question of Virtual Property Rights, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L.
141, 158–59 (2007).
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sorts.70 This, coupled with the fact that the IRS considers said
items to have value to the point where they are taxable, suggests
that virtual property should be considered “something of value,”
thus satisfying the definition in the UIGEA.71
B. Does the Type of Gambling Generally Done With Virtual
Items Satisfy the Requirements Set Forth in the UIGEA?
Along with the value requirement embedded within the
definitions of the UIGEA, the Act also defines the types of bets or
gambling within its scope.72 This wording leads to a range of
possible activities the UIGEA covers, including obvious examples
like lotteries,73 roulette, and other casino-like games of chance.74
Although online poker, via the Black Friday indictments, was the
most prominent application of the UIGEA to this point, there
have been judicial affirmations of its applicability to some of these
other forms of gambling as well.75
Beyond the traditional games of chance, the UIGEA would
likely also extend to betting on professional eSports matches as
well.76 The First Circuit has ruled that bets on traditional sporting
events qualify under the Act.77 Although eSports, as a fairly new
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 17, at 157; Arias, supra note 36, at 1302.
See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938.
72 Flynn, supra note 52, at 86. “[S]taking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a
game subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person
or another person will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.” See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(B) (2012) (“[lottery-type games in] which opportunity to win is predominantly subject to chance”).
73 Id. § 5362(1)(B) (“The term ‘bet or wager’ ... includes the purchase of a
chance or opportunity to win a lottery ....”)
74 Id. § 5362(1)(A) (“The term ‘bet or wager’ ... means the staking or risking
by any person of something of value upon the outcome of ... a game subject to
chance ....”); see D. A. Norris, Annotation, What are games of chance, games of
skill, and mixed games of chance and skill, 135 A.L.R. 104 (1941).
75 See, e.g., California v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, No. 14cv2724, 2014
WL 12526720, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (determining that bingo, as well as poker,
would qualify as a violation of UIGEA).
76 § 5362(1)(A) (“The term ‘bet or wager’ ... means the staking or risking by
any person of something of value upon the outcome of ... a sporting event ....”)
77 United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 729 (1st Cir. 2014) (Defendant was
taking bets on sporting events via the Internet; the court ruled that these bets
qualified as “unlawful gambling” under UIGEA).
70
71
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industry, has had very little attention in the form of academic
studies to this point, at least some contemporary commentators
argue that it fits within the traditional boundaries of a sport, 78
thus permitting regulation under the UIGEA per the First Circuit.79
Additionally, even if one does not consider eSports to qualify as
sporting events as specifically named in section 5362(1)(A), they
would still likely qualify under this subsection, due to the fact
that any competitive eSports match is “a contest of others.”80
Virtual property gambling has encompassed all of the above
types of betting, and others as well. Second Life players hosted
virtual slot machines, poker, and blackjack in 2007.81 Currently,
using CS:GO property alone, one can make bets on eSports and
traditional sports, or play games of chance, including virtual slots,
dice games, coin flips, and roulette spins.82 Because it seems
likely that wagers made with virtual property satisfy the value
requirement of UIGEA, and wagers on these types of games
satisfy the definitions of gambling under the Act, it is therefore
likely that the types of gambling typically done using virtual
property would qualify to be regulated under the UIGEA.
C. If the U.S. Government Decided to Invoke the UIGEA Against
Virtual Property Gambling, Which Parties Would Be Liable
Under the Act?
If the U.S. government does target Internet providers of
virtual property gambling with the UIGEA, there are two primary
types of parties which might be liable under the provisions of the
Act: game publishers and third-party gambling providers.83 As
discussed previously, UIGEA applications target the revenue
stream for Internet gambling providers by making it illegal to
receive payments connected to these bets.84 Because the creators
See, e.g., Hamari, supra note 3 (eSports is defined as “a form of sports
where the primary aspects of the sport are facilitated by electronic systems.”)
(emphasis added).
79 See Lyons, 740 F.3d at 729 (noting that it is illegal to transmit or receive
a sports bet in interstate commerce).
80 § 5362(1)(A).
81 See Ramasastry, supra note 66.
82 See Assael, supra note 4.
83 See Ramasastry, supra note 66.
84 According to the Congressional Research Service, “[t]he Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) seeks to cut off the flow of revenue to
78
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of any virtual property are the ones initially releasing said
property into the wider marketplace in exchange for an initial
payment, if not ongoing control over the virtual items or currency
within their virtual worlds, they would likely fall squarely within
the crosshairs of the Justice Department as it attempts to wield
UIGEA provisions.85 If, as in Second Life, third parties are
actually using the game world itself to host casino games and other
forms of betting, it is likely that the answer is yes.86 The UIGEA
holds liable “a financial transaction provider, or any interactive
computer service or telecommunications service” with knowledge
and control of bets and which owns, controls, operates, manages,
supervises, or directs any Internet website at which gambling takes
place.87 This appears to be fairly straightforward; for those games
in which transactions and other monetary (via currency or other
forms of valuable property) interactions take place, the publishers
would likely face an uphill battle to show a lack of liability.
For those publishers that do not directly host their own inworld currency, unlike Second Life, there is an additional layer of
abstraction. As Valve, developer and publisher of CS:GO, is responsible for a considerable gambling economy stemming from its
games, it will serve as a useful case study for this subsection.88
In order to purchase items from Valve, including keys or
other items, a user must first deposit real money into their Steam
account, which converts that money to Steam credit and is nonrefundable back into real money.89 Valve currently accepts
deposits via PayPal, an electronic money transferring service, and
credit cards.90 The UIGEA prohibits persons engaged in the
business of betting or wagering from knowingly accepting, in connection with unlawful Internet gambling: “credit, or the proceeds
of credit ... (including credit extended through the use of a credit
unlawful Internet gambling business. It outlaws receipt of checks, credit card
charges, electronic funds transfers, and the like by such businesses.” Flynn,
supra note 52, at 82.
85 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 94–99 (discussing the process of
obtaining virtual items in CS:GO).
86 See Ramasastry, supra note 66.
87 31 U.S.C. § 5367 (2006).
88 CS:GO item gambling alone accounted for an estimated $5 billion in wagers in 2016. Assael, supra note 4.
89 Id.
90 Community Market FAQ, supra note 63.
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card)” and “an electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted by
or through a money transmitting business, or the proceeds of an
electronic fund transfer or money transmitting service ....”91 These
provisions certainly cover both credit card payments and PayPal
transfers, and it is likely that any gambling involving virtual
property on Valve’s platform qualifies as unlawful.92 However,
there are two further elements of this statute to satisfy before
Valve is clearly liable.
The first additional element that must be met is the
“knowingly” requirement embedded in this section.93 Valve is
certainly aware that not an insignificant portion of its customers
are using their in-game items for gambling; in 2016, it sent more
than forty cease-and-desist letters to websites taking bets and
wagers using CS:GO items.94 Some Steam users, however, presumably never use any of their Steam Wallet funds to purchase
virtual property; and of those users who do possess certain ingame items, some never use their items to gamble.95 Unlike the
Internet poker companies targeted on Black Friday or the defendant in Lyons, Valve might have a plausible argument that it has
never knowingly accepted any deposit to be used for illegal
gambling.96 Valve receives many deposits each day and has no
way of knowing which will be used to purchase virtual property
to be wagered, and which will simply be used to purchase games
or other things within the Steam system.
Unfortunately, the lack of judicial precedent on the matter
limits any forecast regarding this argument.97 One potential
31 U.S.C. § 5363(1)ï(2) (2012).
See Lawrence Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment
System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 280–81 (2016).
93 § 5363.
94 Assael, supra note 4.
95 For example, Valve has sold 21 million copies of CS:GO, and while more
than three million people wagered virtual items in 2015, that obviously leaves
many purchasers of the game who did not gamble. See Joshua Brustein & Eben
Novy-Williams, Virtual Weapons Are Turning Teen Gamers Into Serious Gamblers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-vir
tual-guns-counterstrike-gambling/ [https://perma.cc/9TX5-W9YX]
96 See Harris, supra note 1 (including the indictment against the three providers); see also United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 714 (1st Cir. 2014).
97 See supra text accompanying notes 19–20.
91
92
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analogy might be found in money laundering, in which the law
states that the government need not “show that funds withdrawn
from the defendant’s account could not possibly have come from
any source other than the unlawful activity.”98 In other words, if
an individual or institution is knowingly receiving funds from
both legitimate and illegitimate sources, all funds are tainted.99
Similarly, a court faced with a complaint against Valve under the
UIGEA might conclude that all deposits are tainted because
Valve is knowingly receiving both legitimate and illegitimate
deposits, and separating out the individual sources of each is
immaterial and defeats the purpose of the UIGEA.100
The remaining additional element in the UIGEA is the
requirement that a defendant must be “engaged in the business
of betting or wagering ....”101 Valve has argued that it neither runs
nor endorses any of the gambling surrounding Steam items;102 because of this, they are not “engaged” in the gambling industry.103
There are two major avenues, however, where this argument might
fail, one of which applies to game publishers generally and one
specifically to Valve.
First, a primary concern for any company offering virtual
property in some way is that investigators or regulatory agencies
will determine that the company’s policies are inexorably tied up
in gambling operation making use of the items it offers, and thus
it is indeed “engaged in the business of betting or wagering ....”104
The argument specifically against Valve revolves around “cases,”
the primary method of obtaining in-game items in CS:GO.105
Players obtain these cases, which are essentially virtual item
United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. The court explains that, once commingled, legitimate and illegitimate
funds are indistinguishable, which would defeat the entire purpose of moneylaundering statutes. Id.
100 Id.; see also Assael, supra note 4.
101 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2012).
102 In-Game Item Trading Update, VALVE, INC. (July 13, 2016), http://store
.steampowered.com/news/22883/ [https://perma.cc/3PYC-G8VL]. Valve backed
this assertion by sending the many cease-and-desist notices to gambling sites
in 2016. Assael, supra note 4.
103 In-Game Item Trading Update, supra note 102.
104 § 5363.
105 Assael, supra note 4.
98
99
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containers, through the ordinary course of playing the game.106
Any player willing to purchase a $2.49 “key” from Valve can
“open” the case, which triggers a randomized wheel that selects a
virtual item for the player to keep.107 These items range in value
on the Steam Market and other marketplaces from a few cents to
thousands of dollars.108 Unlike a traditional bet, the user is
guaranteed to receive an item in exchange for their $2.49;
however, it is far more likely than not that the item she receives
is “worth” considerably less than her investment.109
It is possible that courts would consider this to be a form of
gambling. Under the UIGEA, activities considered to be bets or
wagers include those which stake or risk “something of value upon
the outcome of ... a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or
understanding that the person or another person will receive
something of value in the event of a certain outcome.”110 The key
question is whether a case opening qualifies as one of these events.
Case openings, which in some ways simulate a virtual slot machine,
are subject to chance and randomness;111 however, unlike, say, a
traditional slot machine, a spin of which is fully randomized and
often results in no prize,112 a user opening a case is guaranteed to
receive an in-game item from their investment.113
While the statutory language within the UIGEA is vague
regarding which “certain outcomes” qualify,114 there is some case
law which may help evaluate case openings with more focus.115
Consumers may purchase packs of trading cards, which are
guaranteed to include a set number of cards within them.116 These
packs have a chance to include “insert” or “chase” cards, which
are rarer and more desirable to card collectors, and thus more
Id.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (2012).
111 Assael, supra note 4.
112 Norris, supra note 74.
113 Assael, supra note 4.
114 § 5362(1)(A).
115 See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Intern., LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.
2002); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1998).
116 See, e.g., Price, 138 F.3d at 604.
106
107
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valuable on the secondary market.117 The Ninth Circuit held in
Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Intern., LP that opening a pack and not
receiving a “insert” card is not a cognizable injury, as consumers
receive value in the form of a certain number of cards, which may
or may not include an “insert” card, in exchange for what they
paid as a purchase price.118 However, the court did not rule on
whether the act of opening a pack was indeed a form of gambling,
instead simply deciding that even if the defendants’ activities did
constitute illegal gambling, it was immaterial to the final
holding.119 The Fifth Circuit has found similarly as well.120
The trading card cases were the forerunners to McLeod v.
Valve Corp., in which the Western District of Washington similarly
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, with heavy reliance upon the
holdings from the trading card analogues.121 McLeod is relevant
in this discussion because the court recognized that virtual items
are analogous to tangible property in the form of trading cards,
and that by betting with their virtual items, plaintiffs had “an
opportunity to win and received a benefit of their bargain,”
analogous to Chaset.122 Thus, the argument in that case that
consumers receive exactly what they pay for would likely transfer
to case openings as well—that is, for their $2.49, CS:GO players
receive a single item, which has the chance to be something of
high scarcity and rarity.123 This suggests that courts feel as
though consumers receive something of value in every outcome
when they open a pack or a case, which would likely defeat the
UIGEA’s “certain outcome” language if Valve was ever challenged
See, e.g., Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086.
Id. at 1087.
119 Id. at 1087–88.
120 See, e.g., Price, 138 F.3d at 607–08. Note, however, that both Chaset and
Price were not cases brought under UIGEA; rather, they were claims against
the trading card distributors under anti-racketeering statutes. Both cases were
dismissed due to plaintiffs’ lack of standing under these statutes.
121 See McLeod v. Valve Corp., No. C16-1227-JCC, 2016 WL 5792695, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2016). Like Chaset and Price, this is not a UIGEA case;
rather, plaintiffs attempted to sue under anti-racketeering law. Note that
McLeod has no direct relevance to case openings, which are not referred to once
throughout the decision. Id. at *1–5.
122 Id. at *4.
123 Assael, supra note 4.
117
118
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on this issue specifically in court, suggesting that Valve (or other
publishers who in the future implement a similar system into
their own games) would not be liable under the UIGEA for these
sorts of virtual item sales and distributions.124
While it is uncertain whether game publishers, such as
Valve, would be liable under the UIGEA, the other major parties
the U.S. government might target would be the companies specifically taking advantage of the existence of virtual items and
actually hosting and providing gambling services with the items
as currency.125 Once again, the system Valve has built into Steam
serves as a useful case study. Steam operates using an access
system which allows third parties to engage with and utilize the
platform.126 This approach gives Valve a great deal of flexibility
and openness to innovation from Steam users; on the other hand,
it also allows third parties to take advantage of Steam’s infratructure, including item inventories and trading, to engage in a
variety of different activities, including gambling.127 For these
entities, the analysis is less convoluted than that of Valve; they
are in the business of betting or wagering, in connection with
unlawful gambling on the Internet, and are knowingly accepting
payments for that purpose.128
One possible defense for item gambling websites is that the
UIGEA does not specifically discuss virtual items as a prohibited
form of payment.129 However, the government could use several
arguments to get around this defense. First, as mentioned previously, section 5363(2) of the UIGEA prohibits electronic fund
transfers.130 An electronic fund transfer is defined as “any transfer of
funds ... which is initiated through an electronic terminal ... or
31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (2006).
Id. § 5362(10)(A); Assael, supra note 4.
126 Assael, supra note 4. This system is called an “application programming
interface” (API). Anyone may obtain access to Steam’s API system, so long as
they possess a Steam account, fill out a form, and agree to the API terms of
use. Steam Web API Documentation, VALVE, INC., https://steamcommunity.com
/dev [https://perma.cc/A6W7-JD4W].
127 Assael, supra note 4.
128 See 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
129 Id.
130 Id. § 5363(2).
124
125

342 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:321
computer ... so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account.”131 Any transaction involving
Steam items is necessarily initiated electronically, as there are no
real items involved; however, it is very unlikely that a court would
decide that a gambling website qualifies as a financial institution.132
Should this subsection of the UIGEA fail, the government
may instead invoke section 5363(4), which permits the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to issue regulations defining additional
types of transactions that qualify under the UIGEA.133 This subsection also applies to financial institutions, but provides considerable leeway to the Federal Reserve to decide on how a financial
institution is involved in order to invoke the Act.134 This is not a
sure thing, however, with the current construction of the UIGEA;
unlike, for example, the complaints against the online poker companies, there are no payment processors or financial institutions involved for any gambling website dealing strictly in virtual items.135
Virtual item gambling currently exists in a legal gray
area.136 While the UIGEA is not the only statute regulating
gambling in the United States,137 it has been applied recently and
effectively against gambling establishments existing strictly on
the Internet, most notably the poker sites on Black Friday.138
Though both game publishers and gambling providers would have
defenses against Department of Justice prosecutors relying upon
15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7) (2012).
A financial institution is defined as a private or public organization that
acts “as a channel between savers and borrowers of funds.” Financial Institution, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/fi
nancial-institution.html [https://perma.cc/989H-YYPV].
133 31 U.S.C. § 5363(4) (2006).
134 Id. “In other words, even if a form of funds does not fit in the first three
categories, the Federal Reserve could issue a regulation to deem its system to
fall within the fourth, catch-all category.” Ramasastry, supra note 66.
135 See First Amended Complaint at 4, U.S. v. PokerStars II Civ. 2564 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/FullTiltAmendSuit _Sept
20_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/M38X-2JK3] (alleging that the defendants deceived U.S. banks and financial institutions with the aid of “highly compensated third party payment processors.”)
136 Chris Grove, Understanding Skin Gambling, NARUS ADVISORS 5 (2016),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/A-Guide-To
-Skin-Gambling.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9Q-JPUB].
137 Id.
138 Harris, supra note 1.
131
132
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the UIGEA, they may very well be found liable both civilly and
criminally under the Act.139
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE UIGEA
Like any governmental regulation of a consumer activity,
the potential application of the UIGEA to virtual item betting has
inherent concerns.140 This Part will first discuss the sound public
policy reasons to pursue regulation of virtual property, via the
UIGEA or otherwise, then conclude by discussing the way the Act
might be implemented, as well as other options aside from the
UIGEA.
A. Arguments in Favor of Federal Regulation of Virtual Property
The UIGEA was originally enacted under the pretext of addressing increasing gambling debt, especially debt accrued via
Internet gambling, which was not well-regulated at the time of
the Act’s passage.141 Although virtual item gambling is not seen
in the same way as more mainstream gambling games, it nonetheless is just as effective as more traditional betting in getting
people addicted and in debt.142 Even worse, because much of this
virtual property being wagered comes from video games, many of
those afflicted are under-aged.143 It seems logical, in a country
where casino gambling is heavily regulated,144 that the easy
31 U.S.C. § 5365 (2006).
Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1627, 1632.
141 31 U.S.C. § 5361(3)ï(4) (2006).
142 Assael, supra note 4 (explaining that virtual items “are a highly effective
tool for hooking those predisposed for addiction”).
143 Though many gamers in general are adults, of the 155 million Americans
who played video games in 2015, twenty-six percent are under the age of eighteen. Essential Facts About the Computer and Video Game Industry, ENT. SOFTWARE ASS’N (2015), http://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ESA-Es
sential-Facts-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC2J-2655]. Assael, supra note 4 (“Kids
are ‘becoming gambling addicts at [thirteen] ....’”).
144 Most states have enacted some sort of minimum gambling age statute,
and many of those without one do not have casinos available within their borders. Complete Guide to USA Casino Gambling, CASINO.ORG, 2017, https://www
.casino.org/us/guide/ [https://perma.cc/3AMD-G2W8].
139
140
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availability of virtual property betting for children and others
would be problematic.145
Underage gambling is understandably a major concern for
watchdogs and others in eSports.146 However, other concerns
around eSports gambling have plagued the industry as well, as
the amount of money at stake has increased.147 One of the most
notable examples of this occurred in 2015 in the iBUYPOWER
scandal, in which arguably the best American CS:GO team
“threw,” or intentionally lost, a professional match against a team
they should have handily defeated.148 By placing virtual item bets
upon themselves to lose on both their own and a multitude of
other Steam accounts, the players received nearly $7,000 in
virtual items for the loss, and others in the know prior to the loss
profited even more.149 After the scandal came to light, Valve
banned all of the players complicit in the match-fix, as well as
others strongly linked to it, from professional play in Valvesponsored events indefinitely, citing the impact that events like
match-fixing have “on the health and stability of [the] sport.”150
Events like this are made possible in part by the unregulated
nature of virtual property; unlike traditional, brick-and-mortar
Assael, supra note 4.
Id. (“These kids, man, they look up to you. They think if their idols can
make $13,000 in five minutes, they can too. But we all know that’s not true ....
Let these kids go to school, man.”)
147 See, e.g., Annabelle Fischer, Gambit fines AdreN, mou, Dosia for TWC
incident, THESCORE ESPORTS (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.thescoreesports
.com/csgo/news/10578-gambit-fines-adren-mou-dosia-for-twc-incident [https://
perma.cc/GS4S-DRXD] (an example of teams in professional matches utilizing
“ringers,” other more skilled players from other teams); Aurangzeb Durrani,
Match-fixing comes to the world of e-sports, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 23, 2016),
https://www.techcrunch.com/2016/04/23/match-fixing-comes-to-the-world-of-e
-sports/ [https://perma.cc/2R85-T7AJ] (discussing match-fixing among professional eSports players in several major games, including CS:GO and Dota 2).
148 Richard Lewis, New evidence points to match-fixing at highest level of
American Counter-Strike, DOT ESPORTS (Jan. 16, 2015, 10:03 PM), https://www
.dotesports.com/counter-strike/match-fixing-counter-strike-ibuypower-netcode
-guides-1256 [https://perma.cc/VY4S-FCLV].
149 Philippa Warr, Valve Bans Players Caught in CS:GO Match-fixing,
ROCKPAPERSHOTGUN (Jan. 27, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www.rockpapershotgun
.com/2015/01/27/counter-strike-global-offensive-match-fixing/ [https://perma.cc
/JW5C-NQ2Y].
150 Lewis, supra note 148.
145
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casinos which are heavily regulated,151 the lack of oversight in
virtual property and eSports betting continues to make scandals
like match fixing more possible than in other betting markets.152
It is, of course, possible for the government to criminalize
outright online gambling, with or without virtual property; as the
poker example shows, however, even with very limited legal options available, American citizens will seek out those sites which
still remain available to them.153 It is better for those who do wish
to partake in gambling that the government does regulate providers, as it is safer if the government is able to establish a market
and regulate it to prevent fraudulent or illegitimate parties from
preying on American gamblers.154 Further, regulations allowing
virtual item gambling would likely attract more established,
legitimate providers into the American market, as the looming
risk of the UIGEA or other criminal statutes would no longer
exist.155 It is even possible that publishers like Valve would themselves get involved in the potentially lucrative market, taking
intermediaries out of the equation and streamlining the marketplace for all involved.156
While gambling is the primary concern of this Note, there
are other concerns stemming from the general lack of regulation
on virtual property as well (though these concerns are admittedly
not addressable via UIGEA implementation). Since many virtual
items are sold via black market transactions—that is, outside any
marketplace officially sanctioned by game publishers—buyers are
susceptible to scams and other pitfalls along the way.157 There is
also the potential for outright theft, for which a victim would have
no recourse without recognizance of the inherent value in virtual
property.158 If the goal is fairness and protection for consumers of
See, e.g., Gaming Statutes & Regulations, NEV. GAMING COMM’N, http://
www.gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx?page=51 [https://perma.cc/753S-FKAY] (listing
the many regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission and Nevada Gaming
Control Board).
152 Brustein & Novy-Williams, supra note 95.
153 Nevill, supra note 49, at 225.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 229.
157 Chein, supra note 36, at 1068–69.
158 Arias, supra note 36, at 1308.
151
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software which features virtual property, it would seem that
there is some necessity to reimagine how the public and the courts
in the United States view said property.
Beyond these practical concerns, there would be other
benefits to regulation of virtual property as well. First and
foremost is the potential taxation revenue should virtual property
be recognized as having real value.159 Given the estimated $5
billion in gambling revenue in 2016 from CS:GO items alone, the
potential windfall to both state and federal revenue services
would not be insignificant.160 Additionally, many virtual item
gambling websites are located outside of U.S. jurisdiction.161
Should the UIGEA be implemented on virtual property gambling
sites in a similar way to its implementation against poker
websites, it can be argued that it is a “protectionist statute geared
to harbor United States currency from being expatriated offshore.”162 As discussed in Part III of this Note, the IRS already
recognizes income derived from sales of virtual items within
Steam’s community marketplace.163 It would seem to be a narrow
conceptual leap to require Valve and other publishers utilizing
virtual property in their software to track more carefully virtual
item transactions; practically speaking, however, this might not
be feasible, given the sheer number of transactions taking place
on a regular basis.164
Ackerman, supra note 17, at 185–86.
Assael, supra note 4.
161 Id. (discussing sites “opening in tax havens like Antigua or in untraceable locations in Russia or China”).
162 Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1632.
163 See supra Part III; Community Market FAQ, supra note 63.
164 At one point in late 2013/early 2014, there were two million Steam transactions taking place per day. Jenna Pitcher, Steam Holiday Sale saw 2M daily
community market transactions, 2M Snow Globe card trades, POLYGON
(Jan. 15, 2014, 11:18 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2014/1/15/5313958/steam
-holiday-sale-saw-2m-daily-community-market-transactions-2m-snow [https://
perma.cc/VXA4-7W88]. Since that time, the number of Steam users has doubled—
from seven million to over fourteen million in January 2017—suggesting that
considerably more transactions would be taking place now. Number of peak concurrent Steam users from November 2012 to July 2017 (in millions), STATISTA
(last visited Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/308 330/number
-stream-users/ [https://perma.cc/MDR9-K7DW].
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B. Alternatives to the UIGEA
As demonstrated by this Note, the current gray area in
which virtual property and virtual item gambling reside is not
likely to last.165 There are a number of good reasons, both substantive and policy, for government regulation of these markets.166
While the UIGEA is likely to be a successful method of doing so,
there are a number of regulatory schemes to which the government may look in order to accomplish its goals.167
First, there are several anti-gambling statutes currently
enacted, besides the UIGEA, to which regulators could turn in
order to crack down on virtual property gambling.168 One of these
is the Wire Act, which criminalizes the transmission of wagering
information.169 Rather than targeting the payment providers as
the UIGEA does,170 the Wire Act targets those “engaged in the
business of betting or wagering” electronically, originally via
telephone but now construed to include the Internet as well.171
The major downside of the Wire Act is that courts have found that
its statutory language refers only to wagers made on sports. 172
Other statutes have similar limitations; the Travel Act, for
example, is not enforceable upon new forms of gambling unless
they have been specifically enumerated.173 Ultimately, of the
existing anti-gambling statutes, the UIGEA is the newest, and
likely the best-equipped to handle the unique issues that virtual
property presents.174
Other possible solutions are more regulatory in nature, similar
to what has been proposed for online poker. One suggestion
follows the fact that most states that currently allow gambling
have their own state Gaming Commission or a similar office that
Grove, supra note 136, at 5.
Chein, supra note 36, at 1068; Nevill, supra note 49, at 222ï24.
167 Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1626.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Nevill, supra note 49, at 210.
171 Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1626 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000)).
172 Id. at 1627 (referencing In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262–63
(5th Cir. 2002)).
173 Id. at 1627–28 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2000)).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 140–41.
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regulates all gambling within the state—a nationwide version of
this equipped specifically to handle and license online gambling,
including virtual item gambling, would be quite useful for the
purposes of oversight.175 The inclusion of virtual property currency
would pose a complication, but as discussed previously, it is similar
enough to tangible property that doing so should be feasible.176
Poker suggests a different solution as well. Currently,
three states have legalized intrastate online poker networks.177 If
the federal government were unwilling to step in and regulate
virtual item gambling on a nationwide basis, states may do so on
their own, as befits the culture and moral views of each individual
population.178 The downside of this approach is that, like in poker,
these sites would only be available to those residing within the
state itself, and the pool of bettors would be considerably diminished.179 Still, for those residing in states which would agree to
legalize these forms of gambling, it would undoubtedly be better
than nothing.180
The final potential regulatory scheme would be a nationwide legislative one. Several states have enacted laws recognizing
new forms of currencies, such as Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies;181 similarly, if Congress were to simply legislate a legal
understanding of virtual property, many of the issues at question
in this Note would be cleared up. Even simply recognizing that
users have property rights in the virtual items they obtain and
possess would allow software users to enjoy the full legal protections of existing property laws and regulations,182 and allow
the IRS or other agencies to treat virtual property just like any
other form of property for the purposes of regulation and
taxation.183 This approach would seem preferable, due to its ability
Nevill, supra note 49, at 227.
See supra text accompanying note 69.
177 Flynn, supra note 52.
178 Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1637ï38.
179 Flynn, supra note 52, at 78.
180 Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1637ï38.
181 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-G:25 (2016) (establishing a commission to study cryptocurrencies); CAL. PENAL CODE § 320.6 (West 2016) (prohibiting
the sale of raffle tickets in exchange for Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency).
182 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 183.
183 Id. at 186.
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to settle a multitude of issues; still, care would have to go into
crafting any such legislation, and given the moral disdain many
lawmakers seem to have toward gambling,184 this approach does
not seem likely to bear fruit in the current political climate.
CONCLUSION
As virtual worlds in video games and other software
continue to be developed and released to consumers, so too will
virtual property within those worlds. Currently, there is very
little regulation of virtual property in the United States, which
has led to various legally suspect uses of these in-game items. The
proliferation of websites and other parties offering gambling
services is perhaps the most notable of these; in the current
deregulated system, there is nothing stopping individuals from
creating their own system for taking wagers without any regard
to whom their customers are. This, however, cannot last—if
companies such as Valve do not take steps to self-regulate the
virtual property under their control, it is likely that the U.S.
government will instead step in, and do so sooner rather than
later. The UIGEA is one possible method by which it might do so,
and is one that would likely be successful. Nevertheless, it is not
so much a matter of if, so much as it is a matter of when and how.
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